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America's Departure from Multilateralism
Highway or Dirt Road to Freer Trade?
CONTENTS
by Jiirgen Stehn
The formation of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and more recently the
aggressive retaliaton measures taken against the European steel industry indicate that
the US is turning towards a new trade strategy that favours the establishment of addi-
tional free trade zones under US leadership and a policy of aggressive bilateralism.
The regionalists' camp maintains that the effectiveness of multilateral trade negotia-
tions within the GATT has eroded as a result of (a) the growing subtlety of the issues
that must be dealt with, (b) the changing character of the protection measures, (c) the
de-
cline of US hegemonic power, and (d) the deepening of European integration. However,
it can be reasonably doubted that regional pacts can do what multilateral negotiations
cannot:
— Even the most ambitious regional trading bloc, the EC, has been unable to deal with
such subtle issues as the dismantling of national subsidy schemes and the abolition
of anti-dumping measures. Similarly, no agreement on the curtailment of US anti-
dumping practices could be reached in the negotiations on the creation of the
NAFTA.
— The experiences of the interwar period elucidate that the world does not need a hege-
mon to push forward international trade negotiations, but rather a country that is
strong enough to keep special domestic interests under control and that is, therefore,
in a position to take the first step in launching a new round of negotiations in order to
bring all parties to the table. Yet, there are no reasons to assume that a move towards
regionalism will reduce the power of domestic interest groups.
— Given that the deepening of EC integration indeed contributed to the erosion of the
multilateral process of trade negotiations, the straightforward conclusion would be
to refrain from setting up any further free trade areas because setting up additional
regional trading blocs would multiply existing problems.
The history of international trade negotiations clearly shows that a policy of aggressive
bilateralism leads into a nearly endless spiral of retaliation rather than towards a liberali-
sation of world markets. The current problems in the GATT system could better be
resolved by partially turning away from the unconditional most-favoured-nation (MFN)
principle, engaging instead in multilateral negotiations that accord MFN status on a con-
ditional basis. It is important, however, that these agreements offer third countries
open access on a conditional basis.
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After having guaranteed the functioning of the
multilateral system of trade negotiations with-
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) for more than 40 years, the United
States is obviously changing its trade strategy.
There is an ongoing debate within the Clinton
administration and among leading US econo-
mists on the potential benefits and costs of
multilateral trade talks. The formation of the
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA)
and more recently the aggressive retaliation
measures against the European steel industry
and the announcement of further tariffs on
European and Japanese exports indicate that
the United States has lost confidence in the
effectiveness of the GATT process and will
likely turn towards a new trade strategy
favouring the establishment of additional free
trade zones under US leadership and a policy
of aggressive bilateralism.
This paper investigates whether an Ameri-
can departure from multilateralism leads on a
highway or a dirt road to freer trade. In Section
II. 1, the analysis starts with a brief discussion
of the welfare effects of regional trading blocs.
In Section II.2, the political economy effects of
the GATT process of multilateral trade nego-
tiations and the formation of free trade areas
will be discussed. Section III examines the
pros and cons of a policy of aggressive bilate-
ralism. In Section IV, it will be shown that a
multilateral system of international trade ne-
gotiations being built upon a conditional most-
favoured-nation (MFN) principle might be the
first-best solution to the current problems of
the GATT.
II. Benefits and Costs of Regional Trading Blocs
1. Welfare Economic Considerations
A discussion of the welfare effects of customs
unions and free trade areas has to start with a
brief restatement of Viner's [1950] classic
analysis of trade creation and trade diversion
because it is still the basis for all welfare eco-
nomic analyses of preferential trading blocs.
His main contribution to trade theory was to
destroy the then common view that any prefer-
ential move towards freer trade would improve
world welfare.
Viner's concept of trade creation and trade
diversion can best be illustrated within a three-
country, one-commodity model. Assume that
the countries A, B, and C are producing a ho-
mogeneous good Q and that country A is the
highest cost producer of Q, B the lowest cost
producer, and C the intermediate cost pro-
ducer. Assume further that country A imposes
an ad valorem tariff on imports from B and C
which is sufficiently high to entirely divert
country A's demand for Q from the lowest
cost producer B to domestic import-competing
suppliers. If, under these initial conditions,
countries A and B decide to establish a cus-
toms union or a free trade area A will shift its
demand from the domestic highest cost pro-
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B. The trade creating effect of a removal of
trade barriers between A and B obviously im-
proves world welfare, since it leads to a more
efficient allocation of world resources.
Note that the realisation of gains from trade
creation heavily depends on the height of the
initial tariff. Given that the initial trade barriers
erected by country A are not high enough to
divert consumers' demand from B to A, the
formation of a free trade area between A and B
will not lead to any trade creation at all. That
is not to say that an elimination of tariff barri-
ers does not improve world welfare. After eco-
nomic integration, consumers in country A are
better off than before, since their real income
increases due to the reduced domestic price of
good Q; but this welfare effect is independent
of the degree of trade creation. We will return
to this point in more depth later on. What can
be said at this stage of analysis is that any
creation of a customs union or a free trade area
between the highest cost producer and the
lowest cost producer of a certain commodity is
advantageous in terms of economic welfare.
Assume alternatively that the initial tariff
imposed by country A is not sufficient to cause
country A's consumers to replace imports from
country B with domestically produced goods
and that A enters a customs union or a free
trade area with C, the intermediate-cost pro-
ducer. In this case, the consumer price in A of
imports from the intermediate-cost producer C
falls below the consumer price of imports from
the most efficient producer B. Consequently,
consumers substitute intermediate-cost prod-
ucts for lowest cost products and trade is di-
verted from third country B to union member
C. In this case, trade diversion leads to a less
efficient allocation of resources compared to
preintegration. As in trade creation, the occur-
rence of trade diverting effects depends on the
height of the initial tariff. If the tariff raises
preintegration consumer prices of country B's
exports to a level above the production cost of
Q, consumers will buy highest cost products
prior to integration and the formation of a cus-
toms union will cause a shift from inefficiently
produced domestic goods to the intermediate-
cost products of union member C. In this case,
trade diversion does not occur and economic
integration is welfare increasing due to the in-
ternal trade creation within the customs union.
More generally, Viner's approach elucidates
that the less initial trade there was with non-
members prior to integration, the smaller the
scope for potential trade diversion after the for-
mation of a customs union or a free trade area
is. Thus, the economic integration of close
trading partners might rather be trade creating
than trade diverting.
From the viewpoint of Viner's rather narrow
concept of trade creation and trade diversion,
the formation of customs unions and free trade
areas is almost as likely to be welfare increas-
ing as welfare decreasing. This conclusion
seems, however, somewhat too pessimistic,
since the concentration on static intercountry
substitution effects covers some potential gains
from preferential trading areas. By turning
from a one-commodity model to a world
where a variety of goods, ranging from close
substitutes to complementaries, is traded, it
can easily be demonstrated that even a Vin-
erian trade-diverting integrated area can im-
prove world welfare. In this more realistic
world, consumers not only substitute between
different regional suppliers but also between
different commodities as a reaction to the for-
mation of a customs union or a free trade area.
Intercommodity substitution occurs because
economic integration eliminates the disparity
between the domestic and international price
ratios of all commodities traded among the
partner countries [Lipsey, I960]. Due to the
resulting change in the relative prices of trad-
ables, consumers substitute a relatively lower
priced commodity produced in the partner
country for a different but higher priced do-
mestic good. Thus, intercommodity substitu-tion can compensate for the welfare losses
from Vinerian intercountry substitution.
Whether the adjustment in relative prices is
indeed sufficient to leave the world better off
after the formation of a trade-diverting prefer-
ential trade area depends, however, on the
magnitudes of the relevant price elasticities.
Moreover, the dynamic effects of economic
integration may mitigate the beggar-thy-neigh-
bour effect of customs unions and free trade
areas:
First, as the real income of consumers
within the integrated area rises as a result of
the decreasing absolute prices of imported
goods, the demand for extracommunity im-
ports is — depending on the height of the rele-
vant price elasticities — likely to increase.
Second, the removal of trade barriers within
a preferential trading area strengthens compe-
tition among the suppliers located in different
member countries. The opening of formerly
segmented markets not only leads to inter-
commodity substitution but also fosters the
development of new competitive products as
well as advanced production technologies that
in turn pushes up real incomes and, therefore,
the demand for imports from third countries.
Third, firms may reallocate their investment
funds after the formation of a customs union or
a free trade area, since they are no longer
forced to follow a defensive foreign invest-
ment strategy in order to overcome high trade
barriers. Instead of developing strategies to
circumvent the costs of artificial market seg-
mentation, firms are free to make their invest-
ment decisions on the basis of the real eco-
nomic advantages of foreign locations. In ad-
dition, economic integration reduces the risk
and uncertainty of foreign investments because
potential investors in member countries are no
longer faced with the risk that protectionist
tendencies in commercial policy will render
the return on their investments unprofitable.
Fourth, firms acting in oligopolistic markets
may be in a position to realise economies of
scale due to the elimination of market segmen-
tation within a free trade area or a customs
union. It is often argued that it was the ra-
tionalisation of production, which the Treaty
of Rome made possible, and the associated
huge rise in intraindustry trade in manufactures
that turned the European Common Market into
a strong economic success from the viewpoint
of both insiders and outsiders. In a similar
vein, all calculations of the likely effects of
Europe 1992 or the formation of the NAFTA
largely rest on gains from increased rationali-
sation and competition [see, e.g., Gasiorek et
al., 1992; Adams et al., 1991; Almon, 1990].
Taking into account the potential welfare-
improving forces of regional economic inte-
gration that go beyond the mere trade creating
effects of Vinerian intercountry substitution
and the fact that almost all empirical estimates
of the benefits and costs of European and
North American integration show that the
world will be better off after integration, it can
be realistically assumed that preferential trade
arrangements are more likely to raise than to
lower world welfare. As Kemp and Wan
[1976] demonstrated, any subset of countries
can always proliferate a customs union in such
a way that the welfare of nonmembers stays
unchanged and the welfare of members is im-
proved, i.e. proliferate a Pareto-efficient cus-
toms union. The basic idea of their approach is
that a reduction in external tariffs can always
compensate for the initial trade diverting
effects of a customs union. However, from a
more realistic viewpoint, it seems rather doubt-
ful that a group of countries forming a free
trade area will always be ready to lower exter-
nal tariffs so as to keep their trade with the
outside world unchanged.
In a recent article, Krugman [1991a], al-
though being an advocate of free trade zones
on political economy grounds, argues that a
preferential trading area will rather move in the
opposite direction. His reasoning is based on
the theory of the optimal tariff. Given that theoptimal tariff for a country aiming at improv-
ing its terms of trade at the expense of the rest
of the world is higher, the lower the elasticity
of world demand for its exports is, it is obvi-
ous that — due to the monopoly power of a
trading bloc — the optimal tariff of a customs
union will normally be higher than the optimal
tariff of its members. But again, we have to
ask whether governments will really behave in
such a way. If politicians were indeed eager for
improving the welfare of their citizens, as the
theory of the optimal tariff supposes, the first-
best strategy would be to remove trade barriers
unilaterally. However, the actors in commer-
cial policy obviously do not behave as welfare
theory predicts. Thus, to get to the heart of the
current debate on the pros and cons of prefer-
ential trading arrangements it is necessary to
turn to the political economy effects of free
trade zones.
2. Political Economy Effects of
Regional Trading Blocs
Although there is a lively debate on the po-
tential benefits and costs resulting from the
formation of further regional trading blocs, it
is widely agreed between the advocates of a
move towards regionalism and the defenders
of the multilateral system of worldwide trade
negotiations that preferential trade arrange-
ments can — under certain conditions — re-
duce the welfare of third countries. The ongo-
ing discussion rather concentrates on the abil-
ity of the GATT to successfully deal with the
current protectionist tendencies in the world
economy. The regionalists' camp, including
such well-known economists as Dornbusch,
Krugman, and Thurow, states that the GATT
process has run out of steam or is even nearly
dead. According to the "Memorial Drive
School", as Bhagwati [1992] called the para-
digm of the regionalists,
1 the effectiveness of
multilateral trade negotiations within the
GATT has eroded due to the growing subtlety
of the issues that must be dealt with, the
changing character of the protection measures,
the decline of US hegemonic power, and the
deepening of European integration [see Dorn-
busch, 1990; Dornbusch et al., 1989; Krug-
man, 1991b; Thurow, 1991].
The arguments of the advocates of free trade
areas can best be evaluated against the back-
ground of the main (theoretical) advantages of
the multilateral road to trade liberalisation.
a. Reference System: Multilateral
Negotiations within the GATT
The principal pillars on which the multilateral
system of trade negotiations within the GATT
is erected, the principle of nondiscrimination
and the concept of "first-difference" reciproc-
ity, are widely regarded as the driving force of
the fairly successful steps towards trade lib-
eralisation in the last 40 years. But it is not its
mere binding to these two principles that
makes the multilateral approach advantageous,
at least theoretically, but the virtuous interac-
tion between them in combination with the
huge number of participants in the round-table
negotiations.
Nondiscrimination in the GATT sense con-
sists of two paradigms: the "Most-Favoured-
Nation" (MFN) clause and the concept of
"national treatment". The MFN clause pro-
vides that, apart from exceptions on which the
negotiating parties have agreed, imports from
all sources should face identical trade barriers,
whereas the concept of national treatment re-
quires that with regard to taxes or regulations
foreign goods are to be treated in the same way
as domestic goods. Neither the MFN clause
nor the principle of national treatment are
Note that the MIT department of economics is at 50
Memorial Drive in Cambridge, Massachusetts.special characteristics of multilateral negotia-
tions. They are just individual ingredients
listed in the recipe for multilateralism that can
also be successfully used to push bilateral or
plurilateral agreements forward to multilateral
commitments.
Take, for example, the United States' Reci-
procal Trade Agreement Act (RTAA) of 1934,
which aimed at mitigating the effects of the
disastrous Hawley-Smoot-Tariff (HST) of
1930. The HST had raised US tariffs signifi-
cantly and generated widespread retaliation
against US exports so that an opening of US
markets was a necessary precondition for pav-
, ing the path towards foreign markets. Thus,
the US government negotiated reciprocal tariff
cuts with trading partners on a bilateral basis
and was at the same time prepared to offer
potential contractors an unconditional MFN
status. Under the RTAA, twenty trade agree-
ments were signed covering about 30 per cent
of US exports and approximately 45 per cent
of imports [Curzon, 1965]. The offer of an
MFN status might have been necessary to
make the negotiation of a sequence of bilateral
deals possible, since no country would agree
on bilateral tariff cuts with the US if it were
faced with the danger that in a following ne-
gotiation another country would get access to
the US market at a lower rate [Winters, 1990].
Nevertheless, the combination of bilateral ne-
gotiations with the MFN clause resulted in a
multilateral trade liberalisation. The example
of the RTAA shows that the application of the
MFN clause is not confined to multilateral
trade negotiations. Thus, nondiscrimination
alone is not sufficient to justify a multilateral
approach of trade liberalisation.
The same holds for the principle of first-
difference reciprocity, which is an essential
pillar of GATT negotiations, although it has
never been defined by the Agreement. Reci-
procity, being as old as trade policy itself, ex-
presses a neomercantilist view of international
trade. In contradiction to economic theory,
which recommends unilateral tariff cuts, it
supposes that increasing sales instead of con-
sumer welfare is the chief objective of trade
policy and that trade liberalisation is imposing
costs rather than generating gains. Since most
politicians and noneconomists in general are
following a neomercantilist paradigm, first-dif-
ference reciprocity may serve as an engine for
trade liberalisation due to at least four reasons
[Bhagwati, 1990, p. 1313]:
— The mutuality of concessions expresses
fairness and, therefore, makes the neces-
sary domestic adjustments arising from
the increased external competition po-
litically more acceptable for the domes-
tic losers of trade liberalisation.
— Being faced with the willingness of
trading partners to lower trade barriers
on a mutual basis, domestic interest
groups might lessen their opposition to
trade liberalisation.
— Given the importance of "second-best"
considerations in the political debate,
short-run effects of trade liberalisation
such as balance-of-payments difficulties
can raise resistance to the removal of
trade barriers. Due to the mutuality of
Liberalisation, reciprocity can serve as a
means to mitigate these short-run ef-
fects.
— Governments may feel like "double win-
ners" if their trading partners liberalise
while they are also liberalising.
It is obvious that reciprocity can also act as
a driving force for trade liberalisation in bila-
teral or plurilateral negotiations. Hence, what
makes multilateral trade talks advantageous
compared to bilateral and plurilateral negotia-
tions is that they bring together simultaneously
a huge number of participants that are willing
to negotiate reciprocal concessions according
to the MFN principle. The fact that all poten-
tial contractors are negotiating at the sametime increases the number of potentially lib-
eralising deals. Thus, the benefits of multilat-
eralism are similar to the benefits of money
over barter [Lawrence, 1990, p. 136]. Success-
ful bilateral negotiations, like barter, require a
double coincidence of wants. In multilateral
negotiations, however, a country may be will-
ing to offer a concession to one trading partner
if it obtains a different benefit from another
trading partner. Moreover, multilateralism al-
lows the formation of coalitions that can ease
the bargaining process. A country unwilling to
negotiate bilateral concessions may be pre-
pared to lower its trade barriers if it can obtain
access to markets in two or three other coun-
tries.
The combination of reciprocity and MFN is
not easy to manage in multilateral negotia-
tions.
2 First, it requires that any agreement
between two countries A and B is to be ex-
tended to all participating nations. This proce-
dure generally creates a free-rider problem, for
all countries are in a position to benefit from A
and B's agreement without offering any con-
cessions. Second, a mechanism has to be de-
veloped that increases the number of poten-
tially liberalising deals, i.e. that allows for
cross-country concessions and the formation of
coalitions. It is one of the main merits of the
GATT that it offers a solution to both prob-
lems.
The latter problem was dealt with by an es-
cape clause in the negotiation rules providing
that all concessions are provisional until the
complete package of agreements is signed.
This procedure extends the initially bilateral
concept of reciprocity to a multilateral one and
therefore facilitates the formation of coalitions
in the GATT negotiations as well as the nego-
tiation of cross-country concessions. It also
strengthens the position of countries being
2 See Winters [1990] for an excellent analysis of the
negotiation procedures of the multilateral trade talks
within the GATT.
prepared to make concessions against potential
free-riders. In order to further curtail the moti-
vation to free-ride, the negotiation procedures
of the early GATT Rounds extended the mer-
cantilist spirit of the bargaining process by
partly diverting the benefits of a MFN conces-
sion to the countries that have negotiated it.
The underlying trick was a rather simple one.
The negotiations were conducted bilaterally on
basis of the so-called request-and-offer system,
i.e. a country offered a concession A if a part-
ner country offered a concession B. However,
a country was only allowed to request a con-
cession on a given product if it was in the
position of a "principal supplier", i.e. if it held
the largest share of the imports of the partner
country. The principal supplier rule minimised
the spillovers to potential free-riders and
maximised the bilateral internalisation of the
gains resulting from an agreement between the
negotiating countries.
According to an analysis by Finger [1979],
the implementation of the principal supplier
rule in the early GATT negotiations has led to
impressive results (Table 1). Finger estimated
the percentage of imports on which tariff re-
ductions and bindings were negotiated (cover-
age of tariff reductions) as well as the bilateral
and multilateral internalisation of the gains
resulting from each round of GATT negotia-
tions. The share of bilateral internalisation lies
within a spectrum ranging from 35 per cent in
the Annecy Round, where the negotiations
were confined to only five new accidents, to
74 per cent in the second Geneva Round.
However, as a result of the high share of bilat-
eral internalisation reached in the first five
GATT Rounds, the fraction of imports covered
by negotiation fell from 56 per cent in the first
Geneva Round to 19 per cent in the Dillon
Round. This development reflects the growing
tendency to negotiate tariff cuts in very nar-
rowly defined product categories which in turn
was a result of the principal supplier rule. Af-
ter the first GATT Round, it became increas-ingly difficult to identify commodities on
which to negotiate because each round was
harder pressed than its predecessor to find mu-
tual principal supplier concessions. During the
Dillon Round, the participants hardly found
anything to talk about due to the limitations
provided by the principal supplier rule. As a
consequence, the negotiating parties decided to
refrain from product-by-product negotiations
and to introduce a formula-based system of
linear tariff cuts with exceptions [Winters,
1990]. This turn to a multilateral procedure of
trade negotiations clearly strengthened the
main advantages of the GATT by increasing
the number of potentially liberalising deals, as
is indicated by the huge rise of the coverage
ratio after the Dillon Round negotiations.
Table 1 — Coverage of Tariff Reductions and


































b. Arguments of the Regionalists'
Camp: An Evaluation
The regionalists' camp concedes that the nego-
tiation procedures of the multilateral system of
trade talks helped to reconstruct world trade
after World War II, but doubts for several rea-
sons that the GATT still has substantial for-
ward momentum [Dornbusch, 1990, pp. 117
ff.]. The growing subtlety of protectionist
measures is regarded as one of the most impor-
tant barriers to further multilateral steps to-
wards trade liberalisation. Increasingly, trade
negotiations must deal with problems that can-
not be solved by removing barriers at national
borders, since intranational policy measures
such as the subsidisation of high-technology
and depressed industries or the regulation of
domestic markets have put on weight in inter-
national trade policy. It is argued that regional
free trade agreements among close neighbours
are in a better position to tackle these subtle is-
sues because the governments of neighbour
states "understand and trust one another to ne-
gotiate at a level of detail and mutual intru-
siveness that parties to global negotiations
cannot" [Krugman, 1991b, p. 19]. But are free
trade areas and customs unions among close
neighbours indeed advantageous with respect
to the curtailment of subsidies and the removal
of market regulations? The history of the most
ambitious regional trading bloc, the EC, rather
points to the opposite direction.
Although government subsidies have been
an essential instrument of national economic
policy in the member states of the EC since the
ratification of the Treaty of Rome, it took al-
most 15 years to put the dismantling of na-
tional subsidy schemes on the agenda of the
Council of Ministers. However, this is not to
say that the member states have been striving
for a reduction of national subsidies since the
early 1970s. The chief objective of the Com-
mission of the EC, which is responsible for the
supervision of national aid schemes, is to co-
ordinate and harmonise the granting of subsi-
dies for depressed and high-technology indus-
tries as well as backward regions within the
Community in order to minimise the competi-
tion distortion effects of national aid. The main
instrument of EC aid supervision is the publi-
cation of binding guidelines and directives in-
cluding qualitative provisions for the prolife-
ration of national subsidy schemes. However,
most guiding rules are so roughly defined as to
leave broad space for the governments of
member states to establish own subsidy pro-
grammes following national interests, as Table
2 indicates. The share of sectoral aid in total10
government subsidies varies between 91.6 per
cent in Luxembourg and 27.6 per cent in
Greece, that of regional aid ranges between
21.1 per cent in Italy and 1.3 per cent in Den-
mark, whereas general subsidies are notably
preferred by the Greek government with 55.1
per cent. Within the main categories of sectoral
and general subsidies the aid schemes of
member states also follow national interests. In
the area of sectoral aid, the subsidies granted
to agriculture in Denmark, Ireland, and the
Netherlands, to the steel industry in Luxem-
bourg, Belgium, and France, to shipbuilding in
Denmark and the United Kingdom and to coal
mining in Belgium, Germany, and the United
Kingdom are well above the EC average.
Thus, it seems to be too optimistic to argue
that a free trade bloc among close neighbours
would be in a better position to coordinate or
even cut national subsidies compared with a
multilateral system of trade negotiations.
From a theoretical viewpoint, this conclu-
sion is not surprising. As long as almost all
governments follow a neomercantilist para-
digm in international trade negotiations, no
major steps towards the curtailment of subsi-
dies will be undertaken in bilateral or plurilat-
eral trade agreements, since third countries
would gain from these commitments without
offering any concessions. The free-rider prob-
lem can only be resolved in multilateral nego-
tiations.
Contrary to the reduction of subsidies, the
efforts to deregulate national markets within
the EC by harmonising or even removing
technical standards and other market segmen-
tations have been rather successful. One
should realise, however, that the negotiations
on the completion of the European Common
Market only started in 1986 with the agree-
ment on the Single European Act and that it
took 34 years to partially create a common
market.
Can free trade areas and customs unions
better deal with the new protectionist instru-
ments like voluntary export restraints, anti-
dumping measures, or orderly marketing
agreements than the GATT? Again, the reason-





































































































































































































Source: OECD [var. issues]; own calculations.11
ing of the advocates of regionalism concen-
trates on the only argument that there is a
better understanding among neighbour states
[Krugman, 1991b, p. 19]. There are neither
strong reasons for nor against this argument.
Nevertheless, in view of the fact that the re-
moval of these "new" trade barriers is at least
as difficult to handle as the reduction of sub-
sidies and that no agreement on the curtailment
of US antidumping practices could be reached
in the negotiations on the creation of the
NAFTA, it cannot be realistically assumed that
regional pacts can do what global negotiations
cannot.
A more serious argument is that the United
States has lost its hegemonic power and, there-
fore, its ability to act as a "lender of last mar-
ket" in the international trade system. The pro-
ponents of regionalism argue that its dominant
position in the early postwar period enabled
the United States to offer system-sustaining
concessions that limited the free-rider problem
of multilateral negotiations. Accounting for a
decreasing share in gross world product and
having lost its dominance in productivity
growth and technological leadership, the
United States is no longer in a position to
serve as a global trade hegemony. Since the
decline of the hegemonic power at a global
level plays no role in regional agreements
where there is either a local hegemony or a
special correlation of forces that makes a glo-
bal hegemon superfluous, the regionalists
advocate the formation of further free trade
areas [Krugman, 1991b].
This argument heavily rests on the he-
gemonic stability theory. It assumes that dif-
ferent distributions of power among states lead
to different degrees of stability in the world
economy and to different levels of openness in
international trade. In its strongest version, it
predicts that a hegemonic system, in which
power is concentrated in the hands of a single
country, will produce the most stable and most
open world economy. The hegemonic stability
theory can be regarded as an extension of the
theory of public goods. It assumes that the
stability and openness of the international eco-
nomic system is an international public good.
Since stability and openness is costly to pro-
vide and the gains from promoting stability
and free trade cannot be fully internalised by a
single country, each country, acting in its own
interest, will be prompted to undertake actions
undermining stability and openness. Thus, a
leader behaving in the collective interest is
necessary to underwrite the system. The most
cited empirical proof of the validity of the he-
gemonic stability theory is that it can explain
the severity of the Great Depression. Accord-
ing to Kindleberger [1973], only a hegemonic
system with a single leader would have been
able to halt the downward spiral of the inter-
national economy during the interwar period.
Yet, Britain was no longer in a position to play
this role and the United States was unwilling
to act as a lender of last market.
Apart from the fact that there are numerous
good reasons to argue that the unwillingness of
the Federal Reserve Board to act as a lender of
last resort rather than the unwillingness of the
US government to play the role of a lender of
last market was responsible for the severity of
the Great Depression, there are other argu-
ments that call into question the explanatory
power of the hegemonic stability theory.
First, from the viewpoint of the hegemonic
approach, there are some similarities in terms
of economic distress and instability between
the years of the Great Depression and the
1970s. In both periods, Western Europe and
the United States were faced with the erosion
of hegemonic power as well as a severe eco-
nomic downturn leading to mounting unem-
ployment rates, huge industrial and agricul-
tural overcapacities, and thus to serious insta-
bilities in the world economy. However, as
Milner [1986] has shown in detail, the protec-
tionist pressure in the 1970s was considerably
weaker than in the 1920s, allowing even sub-12
stantial tariff cuts in the Tokyo Round of
GATT negotiations. Thus, the failure of he-
gemonic power alone cannot be responsible for
the alleged erosion of the multilateral system
of trade negotiations. Second, from a welfare
economic standpoint, it is simply wrong to as-
sume that the openness of markets is an inter-
national public good, since the gains from a
unilateral removal of trade barriers can well be
internalised by a single country. One must
concede, however, that the real world of trade
negotiations is built upon a mercantilist para-
digm that does lead to a free-rider problem.
But the experience of the interwar period
clearly shows that material hegemony is not
sufficient to successfully deal with the free-
rider problem. The United States was by all
means a dominant force in the late 1920s but
was unwilling to lead. Thus, it is rather the
willingness of a country to take a leading role
that gives multilateral trade negotiations a
forward momentum. Yet, the willingness of a
country to make the first steps towards a new
round of multilateral negotiations is not solely
a function of the distribution of power in the
world, but mainly depends on domestic influ-
ences on national trade policy. Hence, to push
forward multilateral negotiations, the world
does not need a hegemon but a country that is
economically strong enough to keep special
domestic interests under control and is, there-
fore, in a position to make the first step to a
new round of worldwide negotiations in order
to bring all parties to the table, as the United
States has successfully done since the Second
World War.
Another argument of the regionalists is that
the deepening of EC integration is to a large
extent responsible for the erosion of the multi-
lateral system of trade negotiations and that
additional free trade areas under the leadership
of the United States are required to compen-
sate for the resulting terms-of-trade deteriora-
tion [Dornbusch, 1990]. Of course, the record
of EC trade policy is mixed. On the one hand,
internal liberalisation has gone hand in hand
with a reduction of external trade barriers in
the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds. On the other
hand, the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP),
the preferential arrangements with a huge
number of developing countries and with the
members of the European Free Trade Associa-
tion (EFTA), the establishment of the Europe-
an Economic Space (EES), and the increasing
use of antidumping measures are clearly discri-
minatory. In addition, the diminishing interest
of the EC in a new round of multilateral trade
negotiations might have been one of the main
reasons for the failure of US efforts to launch a
new GATT Round in 1982 [Aho, Ostry,
1990]. Although the ostensible reason for the
delay was the opposition of a small group of
developing countries led by Brazil and India,
which opposed the inclusion of the so-called
new issues of trade and investment, the launch
would likely have been successful if the EC
and the United States had been able to agree
on timing. The disagreement between the
United States and the EC was largely a result
of the resistance of most EC members to
include agriculture policies in the round-table
negotiations. However, given that the deepen-
ing of EC integration indeed contributed to the
erosion of the multilateral process of trade ne-
gotiations, the straightforward conclusion will
be to refrain from any further customs unions
and free trade areas instead of multiplying the
existing problems through the formation of ad-
ditional trading blocs. There are no reasons to
assume that any free trade area under US lead-
ership will be less harmful for outsiders and
the multilateral system of trade negotiations
than the EC.
The counter argument of the regionalists is
that the United States is striving for the for-
mation of "natural" trading blocs [Krugman,
1991a], i.e. free trade areas among partners
who would have done much of their trade with
one another even in the absence of special
trade agreements. The formation of the13
NAFTA, which is rather welfare improving
than welfare worsening, as almost all analyses
of the trade-creating and trade-diverting effects
have shown [see Almon, 1990; Adams et al.,
1991; Cohen, 1991; Hinojosa-Ojeda, Robin-
son, 1991; Langhammer, 1992], might be a
good example for such a "natural" trade bloc.
But it is fairly questionable whether there are
additional trade areas led by the United States
that could be characterised as "natural". Ac-
cording to the regionalists, the first-best candi-
dates for further regional trade arrangements
are the Latin American states. However, in
view of the existing trade barriers of the
United States, it can be argued that the forma-
tion of free trade areas between the United
States and its Latin American neighbours may
involve considerable costs for third countries
[Bergsten, 1991]. Since tariffs are already very
low, the United States would be forced to offer
a liberalisation of its seven large import quota
regimes. Thus, import barriers for Latin Ame-
rican states in textiles and apparel, steel,
automobiles, machine tools, dairy products,
sugar, and meat would likely be reduced after
the formation of a free trade area. It is obvious
that, with the exception of sugar and probably
meat, the most efficient suppliers of these
products can be found outside of Latin Ameri-
ca. Hence, regional trade arrangements be-
tween the United States and its southern neigh-
bours would almost certainly generate much
more trade with relatively uncompetitive pro-
ducers than with efficient suppliers.
III. Pros and Cons of Aggressive Bilateralism
A further move away from multilateralism was
recently made by Dornbusch [1990] who not
only proposes the formation of additional free
trade areas under US leadership but also advo-
cates a trade policy of aggressive bilateralism.
In his opinion, the trade problems of the
United States are mainly a result of formal and
informal barriers to US exports in several for-
eign countries, especially Japan, leading to a
downward pressure on the dollar and a de-
crease in real wages and living standards in the
United States. As a strategy to open the mar-
kets of those countries that are practising
"unfair" trade policies, which result in an un-
reasonably low import-penetration ratio, he
proposes the setting of numerical targets for
US imports, using sanctions such as provided
in the Super 301 Law as a threat to induce an
offending country to meet the targets. Accord-
ing to this approach, the Japanese problem
should be tackled by forcing Japanese firms to
increase their manufactures imports from the
United States at an average real rate of 15 per
cent a year during the next decade [Dornbusch,
1990, p. 124].
However, apart from the arguments against
the formation of free trade areas that, to a large
extent, can also be raised against a policy of
aggressive bilateralism, there are a number of
additional reasons to argue that the world, in-
cluding the United States, will rather be worse
than better off after a change in policies. First
of all, in order to exert pressure on Japan and
other countries to increase their import share,
the United States might be forced to tempo-
rarily levy tariffs on foreign goods, as it has
recently done with a view to European subsi-
dies in the steel industry. In a world where
most governments are pursuing a mercantilist
strategy in international trade policy and where
interest groups are seeking rents behind high
trade walls, a policy of aggressive bilateralism
rather encourages offended nations to adopt
beggar-thy-neighbour policies of their own in-14
stead of removing existing trade barriers.
Thus, all participants will be left worse off at
the end of the day. Even if a country being
faced with an aggressive trade policy of a
trading partner were prepared to raise its im-
port share, a strategy of aggressive bilateralism
would not necessarily lead to an improvement
of world welfare. Given, for example, that the
United States were successful in improving its
terms of trade with Japan due to a policy of
aggressive bilateralism, Japanese firms would
likely reduce their imports from European and
other countries and thus would give rise to
another spiral of retaliation.
Moreover, it is by all means unrealistic to
assume that a policy assuring fixed export
amounts for domestic producers can temporar-
ily be put into effect and thereafter dismantled
in favour of a liberal trade policy once the de-
sired reforms by foreign countries are achieved
[Baldwin, 1990, p. 200]. The experiences of
the interwar period clearly elucidate that once
interventionist policies are introduced they
gain momentum and are thus very difficult to
reverse. As a reaction to the Hawley-Smoot
tariff of the United States, many countries
were eager to enter discriminatory bilateral
trade arrangements, which induced a down-
ward spiral of international trade. What is
more, the move towards aggressive measures
of retaliation undermined the predictability of
trade policies, since concessions made in one
bilateral negotiation often ran counter to con-
cessions offered to another trading partner in a
preceding agreement. In view of the vast num-
ber of mutual agreements, this led to a nearly
endless process of negotiations and renegotia-
tions and, therefore, destroyed the confidence
in trade commitments at all.
Another serious problem of a results-ori-
ented trade policy is that it opens broad space
for specific economic interest groups to exert
influence on both the choice of goals of re-
sults-oriented measures and the determination
of countries to be accused of practising
"unfair" trade policies. The current discussion
in the United States clearly shows that the
various proponents of a results-oriented trade
policy are pursuing different goals. The pro-
posed list of objectives includes improving the
US terms of trade, increasing US domestic
production and production of US-owned mul-
tinational enterprises, improving the US de-
fence industrial base, obtaining spillovers for
the US economy, maintaining the technologi-
cal capacity of US-owned firms, avoiding
"unfair" trade practices and saving jobs in the
United States [Lawrence, Schultze, 1990]. Be-
cause their goals differ, there is no agreement
among the advocates of a results-oriented trade
policy on the countries that should be subject
to measures of aggressive bilateralism. Some
would confine measures to Japan, others
would also include other Asian countries such
as Korea, whose economic systems are re-
garded as operating by rules different from
those of the United States [see, e.g., Choate,
Linger, 1986], and many would prefer the ex-
tension of this approach to the members of the
EC. Some proponents of a results-oriented
trade policy even advocate global sectorally
quantitative arrangements like the Multifibre
Arrangement [see, e.g., Kuttner, 1989] and
Prestowitz [1988] goes so far as to propose
that international trade generally should be
managed like the IAATA, the international
airline cartel.
It is obvious that, without a precise defini-
tion of "unfair" trading practices, the rules of a
results-oriented trade policy will be deter-
mined by powerful economic interest groups.
However, the definition of "unfairness" is al-
ways a matter of subjective perception, as the
Japanese example shows. There is a long-
standing and ongoing debate on whether Japan
is an outlier in terms of international trade
policy [see, e.g., Balassa, 1986; Saxonhouse,
1983; Lawrence, 1991b; Kreinin, 1988; Lin-
coln, 1990]. While it is widely agreed that
measurable tariff and nontariff trade barriers15
are relatively low in Japan, Japanese consum-
ers and firms are often accused of discriminat-
ing foreign suppliers by following a buy-Japa-
nese attitude. The crucial question is then
whether the alleged buy-Japan attitude is a re-
flection of a certain taste or rather the outcome
of a government and business policy that dis-
criminates foreign firms. If Japanese consum-
ers are willing to forgo cheaper foreign goods,
there are no reasons for aggressive counter-
measures, since one cannot argue with tastes.
Some observers of the Japanese economy,
however, argue that the rather weak antitrust
law in Japan that allows for a high concentra-
tion of Japanese enterprises and the resulting
cartel behaviour of domestic firms are mainly
responsible for Japanese distribution channels
being closed and thus for the small import-
penetration ratio of Japan. But evidence for
this statement that is sufficient to justify a
policy of aggressive bilateralism against Japan
is still missing.
Even in the case that the Japanese markets
are indeed relatively closed due to the erection
of informal trade barriers, it can be reasonably
doubted that a strategy of aggressive bilateral-
ism will lead to a more liberal trade policy in
Japan. Given that a results-oriented approach
does not encourage the Japanese government
to retaliate and thus raises the volume of Japa-
nese imports, it might lead to more, rather than
less, government and corporate control over
domestic markets [Lawrence, Schultze, 1990,
p. 28]. In order to enforce certain input targets,
a powerful Ministry of Trade and Industry
(MITI) is needed to organise and monitor
buying cartels in all industries of the economy.
Moreover, the economic power of the famous
Keiretsu would certainly increase, since they
would be responsible for the distribution of
general import targets to individual industries
and enterprises. Instead of creating a market
that is open in the most fundamental sense, i.e.
a market that can be contested by new firms,
both foreign and domestic, measures of ag-
gressive bilateralism would enforce Japan to
adopt precisely that kind of economic policy
that is seen with suspicion by the advocates of
a results-oriented trade strategy.
Finally, a results-oriented approach would
endanger the success of the rules-oriented
strategy of negotiations with Japan preferred
by the US government during the last decade.
Particularly rapid growth in US exports to Ja-
pan has occurred in those sectors where nego-
tiations to change the rules have been con-
cluded. The negotiations under the Market-
Opening Sector-Specific (MOSS) talks in the
mid-1980s have resulted in an impressive in-
crease in Japanese imports in the four sectors
that were singled out for negotiations
[Lawrence, 1990]. US exports to Japan in the
four product categories combined swell by
46.5 per cent, an increase well above the 24.8
per cent rise in total US exports to Japan dur-
ing the same period. It can be realistically as-
sumed that these commitments will be used by
the Japanese government as a weapon to re-
taliate if the US shifts to an aggressive trade
policy.
IV. Free-Riders, Foot-Draggers, and the Conditional Most-Favoured-Nation
Principle
The preceding analysis clearly shows that any
departure from multilateralism is rather a dirt
road than a highway to freer trade and, in the
worst case, could even lead into a dead end.
However, two serious problems of multilateral
trade talks within the GATT are apparent:16
First, it is increasingly difficult to bring all
parties to the negotiation table. One of the rea-
sons for the success story of the GATT after
World War II has been the willingness of the
United States to make the first step towards a
new round of concessions and thus to offer
strong incentives for other countries to partici-
pate in worldwide negotiations. The first six
GATT Rounds mainly aimed at cutting tariffs
on an unconditional MFN basis. This approach
worked well as long as the great bulk of trade
was conducted among the United States, Can-
ada, Western Europe, and Japan and the main
trading partners of the United States had a
lively interest to participate in the negotiations
by offering own substantial concessions to the
bargain in order to gain from a potential
opening of US markets. However, in the 1980s
the tendency to act as a free-rider in multilat-
eral negotiations has grown substantially [Huf-
bauer, Schott, 1985]. In view of the increasing
inability and unwillingness of the United
States to prevail upon the growing demand of
domestic interest groups for protection against
competitors abroad, this problem might be-
come even more important in the future.
Although a single free-rider does not impose
much of a burden on the multilateral trade
system, the growing number of nonactive par-
ticipants in the GATT Rounds creates a signi-
ficant leakage when benefits are extended on
an unconditional MFN basis [Hufbauer,
Schott, 1985, p. 20]. As a consequence, major
exporters such as the United States increas-
ingly refrain from multilateral commitments in
favour of bilateral and plurilateral agreements.
Of course, from a purely welfare economic
standpoint, there does not exist a free-rider
problem in international trade negotiations,
since the gains from trade liberalisation can
well be internalised by a single country. How-
ever, for actual commercial policy it is rather
unimportant what economists know, but very
important what the responsible actors think.
Almost all observers of multilateral trade ne-
gotiations agree that the leading actors in the
GATT game are following a mercantilist para-
digm [see, e.g., Snape, 1988; Hagelstam,
1991; Krugman, 1992]. Thus, economists are
faced with the task to think about efficient
rules for this second-best game.
Second, there is no efficient mechanism in
the GATT system forcing countries that are
retarding a further development of multilateral
trade negotiations or that are not playing ac-
cording to the rules of the GATT game to join
the liberalisation club. If these countries are
important exporters so that no agreement can
be reached without their participation in multi-
lateral negotiations, they are in a position to
act as "foot draggers" in the liberalisation
process. It would certainly be difficult, for ex-
ample, for the United States and the leading
less developed countries to sign an agreement
about major liberalisation efforts in textiles
and clothing without the active presence of
Europe at the negotiation table.
Both problems could be solved within the
GATT by partially turning from the uncondi-
tional MFN principle to plurilateral negotia-
tions on a conditional MFN basis. It is impor-
tant, however, that these agreements offer open
access on a conditional basis. That means that
country A extends to C all concessions granted
by treaty to B, if C matches the concessions
made by B to A.
3
The conditional MFN principle has been
criticised for imposing a considerable risk on
producers in the signatory countries. It has
been argued that the output response of pro-
ducers to a trade liberalisation on basis of a
conditional MFN principle is likely to be
weaker and thus the welfare gains are likely to
be smaller than under the unconditional MFN
principle [Baldwin, 1990]. Under the condi-
tional MFN principle, producers in a signatory
See for similar proposals along this line Hufbauer,
Schott [1985]; Baldwin [1990]; Bhagwati [1991];
Lawrence [1991a]; Nunnenkamp [1993].17
country face the risk that, after expanding their
capacity in order to contest the formerly closed
markets, they will realise sunk costs when
other countries with lower production costs
sign the agreement later. As a result, producers
in countries that are among the initial signato-
ries to such agreements are likely to refrain
from increasing their capacities and might
even lobby against the admission of new club
members [Baldwin, 1990, p. 204]. Moreover,
initial signatories may push for a renegotiation
of the agreement when additional countries
enter the liberalisation club, since the conces-
sions may run out of balance due to the exten-
sion of the commitments to third parties.
Whether this risk-averse behaviour of enter-
prises plays an important role when world-
wide negotiations are based on the conditional
MFN principle, is an empirical question. From
a theoretical viewpoint, a partial shift from un-
conditional to conditional MFN agreements is,
compared with the establishment of further
closed trading areas or a policy of aggressive
bilateralism, a preferable solution to the exist-
ing problems of the GATT process of trade
liberalisation, since it does not block the way
towards a multilateral liberalisation of world
trade. Given that countries are not ready to
enter into agreements on basis of a conditional
MFN principle, since these agreements in-
crease the investors' risk and do not allow for
a sufficient internalisation of the resulting
gains from trade liberalisation, it will be ne-
cessary to further restrict the access of third
parties to the liberalisation club. One could
think about commitments that are similar to
national and international patent systems, i.e.
agreements that allow third countries to join
the club only after an intermediate period of
six or eight years. Of course, for a transition
period, agreements of this kind would run
counter to the principles of the GATT process
of international trade liberalisation. However,
if the actors in international trade policy are
indeed pursuing a neomercantilist strategy,
such a second-best solution will be the only
way that brings all potentially interested par-
ties to the negotiation table in the short run and
simultaneously allows for a multilateral liber-
alisation of world trade in the long run.18
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